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ABSTRACT: 
Political liberals are significantly more supportive than conservatives toward walkable, 
mixed-use neighborhoods, transit-oriented development, and other aspects of the 
“compact city,” not just in their views about government policy toward metropolitan 
development but also in their consumption preferences regarding neighborhoods. I argue 
that social psychologists’ theory of moral intuitionism helps account for these 
differences. In this view, liberals and conservatives emphasize different sets of affective, 
emotion-laden moral impulses – such as those involving fairness, purity, or ingroup 
loyalty – predisposing them toward particular reactions to compact development. 
Political ideologies also are associated with different personality traits that are relevant to 
opinions on the built environment. To explore the intuitionist hypothesis, I review 
qualitative accounts that suggest an association between certain moral worldviews and 
attitudes toward development patterns. I then conduct multivariate analysis of a public 
opinion survey that contained questions relevant to moral foundations and to views on 
compact development. 
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Compact development, sometimes called “smart growth,” initially would not 
appear to be an obvious candidate for an ideologically polarizing issue. Though many 
political liberals have embraced compact growth, noting its potential environmental and 
equity benefits, one might also anticipate that free-market conservatives would support 
eliminating the strict government regulations such as density restrictions and single-use 
zoning that tend to lead to traditional suburban sprawl.  
Nevertheless, recent empirical research demonstrates that liberal versus 
conservative political ideology is one of the most significant, weighty correlates of 
individual attitudes toward compact development. Moreover, ideology is predictive not 
only of policy attitudes (e.g., whether government should direct new growth toward older 
centers) but also predicts consumption preferences (e.g., the desire to live in a walkable 
or transit-oriented neighborhood) (Lewis & Baldassare, 2010). What renders this issue, 
conceivably a topic of consensus, so divisive?  
I suggest in this article that we are looking in the wrong place if we expect 
people’s preferences on land-use policy to emerge whole-cloth from coherent reasoning 
about government’s role in the economy, or even from individuals’ views of financial 
self-interest or environmental concern. Rather, I draw on insights from an emerging body 
of literature in social psychology and political behavior to help explain the 
liberal/conservative split on the built environment. This perspective suggests that 
intuition-based, emotion-laden impulses – a relatively automatic or “gut” morality rather 
than high-level cognitive reasoning – underlie many left/right differences. In the case at 
hand, I suggest that these impulses play a significant role in structuring attitudes toward 
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land use and metropolitan development. In this view, the different sets of preferences for 
living environments associated with the political left and right emerge in part from the 
fundamentally different “moral intuitions” these groups have about what is the “right” or 
“correct” way to live in an urbanized society. At the same time, these different intuitions 
provoke significant differences between liberals and conservatives in the types of moral 
outrage they harbor toward actors or development patterns that are seen as violating their 
values.  It is also likely that these different views of the built environment reflect 
differences in personality traits that are themselves associated with allegiance to the 
political left or right. 
In sum, this project aims to bring together insights from political science, 
psychology, social neuroscience, and urban planning to help understand the ways in 
which the public might embrace or fail to embrace land-use reforms.  Admittedly, the 
availability of empirical evidence that could directly support or disconfirm the hypothesis 
is limited at this point.  I will draw from public opinion survey data as well as more 
fragmentary qualitative evidence to suggest support for the moral-intuitionist perspective 
on land-use attitudes.  In the concluding section, I describe how the question might be 
investigated more systematically in future research. 
 
THE PUZZLE: WHY IS COMPACT DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE POLITICAL LEFT? 
 Proponents have embraced “smart growth,” which I call by the more neutral term 
compact development, as a set of land-use reforms that in their view promises to improve 
the livability and environmental sustainability of metropolitan areas, increase social 
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equity, and achieve economic efficiencies.  These so-called “three E’s” of sustainable 
metropolitan development (environment, equity, economy) are often viewed as broadly 
appealing to diverse constituencies (Congress for the New Urbanism, 2001; Chen, 2000; 
Calthorpe & Fulton, 2001; Brundtland, 1987).  The supposedly broad appeal of smart 
growth is thought to lie in its embrace of goals traditionally associated with the political 
left (social equity and increased opportunity for residents of older neighborhoods), the 
political right (economic competitiveness and allocative efficiency in land use), and other 
seemingly universal or apolitical goals (enhanced livability and preservation of farmland 
and open spaces).  By targeting infrastructure investments and new development to 
existing centers and built-up areas, by creating more walkable, dense, and transit-
accessible environments, and by avoiding wanton development at the metropolitan fringe, 
all of these goals can be furthered, or so the argument goes. 
 Empirical research on public attitudes, however, suggests that Americans are of 
mixed and perhaps somewhat self-contradictory opinions about the land-use changes 
suggested by proponents of compact development (Audirac, 1999; Morrow-Jones, Irwin, 
& Rowe, 2004; Handy et al., 2008; Lewis & Baldassare, 2010).  Although many 
respondents in surveys and interviews favor certain compact-development alternatives to 
traditional suburban development, there are a variety of cleavages among the public in 
support for these land-use reforms. Some of these cleavages center around 
sociodemographic characteristics, such as gender, income, race, age, and the presence of 
children in the household.  But more important for our purposes, political ideology 
(usually self-reported on a liberal-conservative scale) also is often strongly associated 
with land-use opinions. 
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For example, Lewis and Baldassare (2010) reported on two public opinion 
surveys that collectively covered large, representative samples of five western states.  In 
both surveys, respondents were asked to assess tradeoffs between four pairs of 
alternatives:  
 Living in areas with small yards and short commutes versus areas with large lot sizes 
and long commutes 
 Living in mixed-use, walkable areas versus residential-only, auto-oriented areas 
 Living in high-density neighborhoods with transit accessibility versus low-density, 
driving-oriented neighborhoods 
 Supporting infill policies and land preservation versus fringe development and 
avoidance of density and congestion.   
When respondents’ opinions were cross-tabulated with self-described ideology, it was 
found that liberals’ support for each of the compact-development alternatives in these 
four pairs of tradeoffs exceeded support among conservatives by a substantial margin 
(Lewis & Baldassare, 2010, p. 233). The liberal/conservative gap ranged from 9 to 22 
percentage points, as illustrated in Figure 1. Even when controlling in multivariate 
analyses for a wide variety of individual characteristics and perceptions, conservatism 
was associated with a reduction of about 10% in the probability of supporting each of the 
compact-development alternatives. Moreover, the consistency of this tendency was 
notable: Among the many individual characteristics examined, only political ideology 
was consistently a significant predictor of land-use opinion across the four trade-off 
questions, and always in the same direction. Lewis and Baldassare (2010) also found that 
it was conservatives who appeared to be most distinctive, as their opinions differed from 
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those of self-described moderates to a greater degree than liberals’ views differed from 
moderates’ views.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
Results of other studies of public attitudes similarly revealed significant gaps 
between liberals and conservatives in views toward various dimensions of compact 
development. Handy et al. (2008) found that liberal attitudes toward social issues (but not 
financial issues) were associated with support for “traditionally designed communities,” 
which were described in terms similar to New Urbanist principles.  Mohamed (2008) 
showed that the combination of preserving open land and redeveloping cities, a set of 
preferences roughly congruent with compact development, was favored significantly 
more by liberals than by conservatives. In a related vein, Williamson (2008) found a 
statistical association between individuals’ tendency to identify as conservatives and their 
residence in auto-dependent counties with new housing stocks, although he was careful to 
note that the causal direction of this relationship was unclear. The latter study is of 
particular interest since it suggests that the political left and right differ not only in their 
policy opinions about compact development, but in their own living choices. Similarly, 
three of the four pairs of tradeoffs examined by Lewis and Baldassare (2010) dealt with 
personal preferences about what type of neighborhood environment the respondent 
wanted to live in; only one of the survey questions addressed itself to a policy question 
about government intervention (infill efforts by localities). In short, liberals and 
conservatives seem to differ in consumption preferences regarding land use, not just in 
public policy preferences. 
 For proponents of smart growth, these ideological cleavages are a problem, since 
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they detract from the implied notion that society will achieve substantial consensus on 
this set of reforms once the public becomes more fully informed. For social scientists, 
however, the liberal-conservative split on compact development represents an intellectual 
puzzle, not merely a practical political problem. The puzzle is, first, that ideology is 
associated with preferences about where or how to live, not simply with preferences 
about government policy. Second, even if we narrow the scope of the issue to opinions on 
land-use policy, it is not obvious why traditional, dispersed patterns of suburban 
development should be seen as the “conservative” position. After all, the heavy hand of 
government intervention has contributed heavily to the dominance of the traditional 
suburban pattern, through such mechanisms as density restrictions, single-use zoning, 
minimum lot sizes and setbacks, height limits, government-insured mortgages, and 
subsidized highway construction and maintenance (Danielson & Doig, 1982; Jackson, 
1985; Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom, 2001; Hayden, 2004; Beauregard, 2006). 
Indeed, Levine (2005) argued that sprawl and a lack of clustered development result 
largely from distortions of the market introduced by local government land-use 
regulation. Talen and Knaap (2003) similarly found that the forces restricting smart 
growth in suburbia primarily involved excessive local land-use regulations. By 
comparison, allowing for denser, clustered, mixed-use development might be considered 
the free-market alternative.1 
 Thus, one traditional cleavage associated with the left/right distinction – the view 
of government’s proper role in regulating private economic actors – does not seem to 
align with liberal versus conservative positions on land use.  What might be some 
alternative explanations for the left/right split on compact development?  If we view 
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compact development primarily as an expression of sustainability concerns, then liberals’ 
traditionally stronger preference for environmental values (Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 
2001) may structure their opinions on land-use issues as well.  However, some aspects of 
the smart-growth program and New Urbanism (for example, promotion of inner-city 
development, or new design standards such as form-based zoning) are less obviously 
connected to environmentalism. Moreover, Lewis and Baldassare (2010, p. 233) found in 
a multivariate analysis that survey respondents’ stated preference for environmental 
protection over economic growth was not a significant predictor of their attitudes on 
compact development. 
Another possible explanation for liberal/conservative differences involves 
material self-interest.  In this view, conservatives may defend single-use, auto-oriented 
development because they tend to be white homeowners who already seemingly benefit 
from this type of growth pattern, and may be supporting what they view as being in their 
financial or status interests.  However, a majority of Americans live in owner-occupied, 
single-family dwellings (Bennefield & Bonnette, 2003), and this likely means that a 
majority of liberals, or at least a plurality, live in such environments as well.  Moreover, 
the empirical studies noted above controlled statistically for such characteristics as home 
ownership, income, and race, and nevertheless found that political ideology exerted an 
independent influence on opinions of compact development.  In addition, some 
conservative-leaning groups, including certain business and real-estate interests, might be 
expected to profit from the intensification of older centers, land-use mixing, and 
densification promoted under the smart-growth banner.  Indeed, the free-market faith in 
the power of “creative destruction,” whereby market forces are allowed to take their 
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course, would suggest allowing developers to introduce high densities and mixed uses 
into low-density or single-use neighborhoods if the market supports it.   
Thus, the likely suspects – views on government intervention, environmentalism, 
or self-interest – do not easily account for why conservatives tend to disfavor compact 
development while liberals tend to embrace it.  Rather, an alternative explanation seems 
in order.  
 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH:  MORAL INTUITIONISM 
 Perhaps the flaw in each of the proposed explanations above is the implicit 
assumption that liberal/conservative differences on land use must derive or flow from a 
broader, coherent set of issue positions and views of policy – that is, a political ideology. 
Fifty years ago, however, Converse (1964) famously concluded from his empirical work 
on public opinion that people’s policy preferences and political views seemed fleeting, 
inconsistent, and often incoherent; in short, most Americans were simply not politically 
sophisticated enough to really have an ideology, in the way that social scientists generally 
conceive of it. Converse’s dismal assessment raised substantial doubt about the classic 
rationalist model of voting, in which people first determine their own views on issues, 
compare those views to the positions of the candidates and parties, and then support the 
party or candidate closest to their own views. Later generations of public opinion 
researchers suggested an intermediate perspective between the demanding rationalist 
model and Converse’s allegation that citizens hold “nonattitudes.” These scholars argued 
that although average citizens may not have constructed an abstract, fully-formed 
ideology, their policy preferences are nevertheless constrained in meaningful ways by 
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“core values,” such as conceptions of equal opportunity or individualism (Feldman, 1988; 
Goren, 2001).   
Some contemporary research in public opinion and political psychology suggests 
a considerably less rationalist view on how people’s issue positions relate to their 
ideology and vote choices. In this perspective, individuals tend to decide which general 
political “club” they feel most aligned with or socially congruent with (e.g., liberals, 
Republicans, libertarians), and then mold their views on specific policies or controversies 
to comport with the position that “their side” takes in the debate. As columnist David 
Brooks (2004) has summarized this line of research, “Once they have formed an 
affiliation, people bend their philosophies and their perceptions of reality so they become 
more and more aligned with members of their political tribe.” In this view, partisan 
“hearts,” or what we might term intuitions, trump the rationalism of reasoning “minds” 
(Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2004).2 
 Writing in a different disciplinary tradition and using different methodologies, a 
growing number of social psychologists have developed profound insights about the 
origins of individuals’ worldviews and how these worldviews affect orientations toward 
policy issues and social relations. In seeking to understand how humans wrestle with 
decisions and conflicts, this emerging perspective, sometimes called social intuitionism, 
draws upon laboratory experiments, brain imaging, and content analysis of texts and 
speech. These scholars conclude that humans’ decisionmaking and exercise of reason are 
intimately intertwined with the emotional centers of the brain, and that we frequently 
substitute impressions, feelings, and prototypes for difficult choices without realizing it 
(Kahneman, 2011; Fiske, 2011). In short, what Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman (2011) 
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calls “fast” thinking usually trumps “slow” cognition, which is more rigorous, rational, or 
considered. 
Psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2007, 2012), calling his approach moral 
intuitionism, relates this mode of thinking to the ways that the political left and right 
approach the social world. Looking at evidence from societies around the world, Haidt 
and his colleagues show that all groups draw upon the same several sets of fundamental 
intuitions about what is good and bad. These five “moral foundations” are labeled as 
Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/ 
Sanctity.  However, the moral intuitionists demonstrate that liberals and conservatives 
weigh these moral foundations differently. Drawing on Internet questionnaires completed 
by tens of thousands of individuals from many nations, as well as laboratory evidence, 
Haidt and colleagues show that those on the political left tend to heavily prioritize care, 
the prevention of harm to others, and fairness. By contrast, conservatives, while still 
valuing care and fairness, give much more emphasis than liberals to other moral 
impulses:  purity and sanctity, which deal with the need to protect the body, the family, 
and the social group against contamination or degradation; loyalty, which concerns 
ingroup identification and patrol against betrayal; and authority, or the upholding of 
traditional, ordered patterns and hierarchies (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009).3    
Each of the five moral foundations, the intuitionists argue, emerged in human 
groups because each is useful from an evolutionary standpoint (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009). Particularly during the times when homo sapiens lived in bands of hunter-
gatherers, natural selection probably favored those individuals and groups who, for 
example, sought to avoid contamination (e.g., rotting meat, excrement), who remained 
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vigilant against subversion and betrayal, or who exercised care and nurturance for others 
in the group (Haidt, 2012). Studies even suggest that these moral impulses have a 
physiological manifestation, as we might anticipate if we view the impulses as 
evolutionarily useful. The preferences become somewhat “pre-wired” into the human 
psyche, but particular moral impulses may affect some individuals much more than 
others. For instance, in experimental studies, individuals who rate highly on the 
Purity/Sanctity dimension tend to show more physiological evidence of disgust in 
reaction to particular visual stimuli.  Further, individuals’ feelings of disgust tend to 
increase the severity of their moral judgments (Schnall et al., 2008; Erskine et al., 2011). 
And importantly for the current analysis, disgust sensitivity is higher among 
conservatives than nonconservatives (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, & 
Bloom, 2009; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Smith et al., 2011).  
Additional research in social psychology indicates that moral worldviews are 
linked to personality traits.  Most notably, liberals tend to score significantly higher in 
Openness to Experience (neophilia), which is one of the “big five” traits measured in 
standard personality inventories (Jost et al., 2003; Verhulst et al., 2012). There is also 
evidence, although weaker, that the personality trait of Conscientiousness is associated 
with political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003; Carney et al., 2008). As one group of 
authors summarizes the “consistent and converging” research on this topic: 
[P]ersonality differences between liberals and conservatives are robust, replicable, 
and behaviorally significant, especially with respect to social (vs. economic) 
dimensions of ideology. In general, liberals are more open-minded, creative, 
curious, and novelty seeking, whereas conservatives are more orderly, 
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conventional, and better organized (Carney et al., 2008, p. 807).   
Some analysts view conservatism (particularly on social issues) as a type of 
“motivated cognition,” in which a conservative orientation satisfies certain psychological 
needs for an individual, such as reduction of anxiety or of fear (Jost et al., 2003) and a 
provision of order and certainty (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 35).  A variety of 
psychological variables have been shown to be associated with political conservatism, 
including not only lack of openness to experience, but also death anxiety, fear of threat 
and loss, a distaste for ambiguity and uncertainty, and a need for order, structure, and 
closure (Jost et al., 2003). Verhulst, Eaves, & Hatemi (2012), reporting on studies of 
twins, suggest that personality traits such as Openness to Experience do not “cause” 
political ideology, nor vice versa; rather, some underlying genetic factor helps to shape 
both personality and political ideology. However, one need not embrace a genetic 
explanation for behavior in order to accept the importance of intuitive, near-automatic 
judgments and reactions to stimuli.4  
Another set of analysts suggest that people’s political ideologies reflect their 
mental models of proper family structure, with liberals tending toward a “nurturing 
parent” metaphor while conservatives tend toward a “strict father” metaphor (Lakoff, 
2009; McAdams et al., 2008).  In this perspective, too, those on the political right tend to 
gravitate toward social arrangements that they see as promoting or protecting order and 
authority structures, whereas liberals prefer arrangements that nurture individual potential 
and personal autonomy.  In congruence with the parenting metaphors, survey respondents 
who indicate that they hold strict (rather than nurturing) attitudes toward child-rearing 
practices tend toward distinctive positions on a number of policy topics, particularly 
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social issues such as gay rights and issues concerning military toughness (Hetherington & 
Weiler, 2009). These statistical associations persist even after controlling for ideological 
self-placement and political party identification.5 As one psychologist summarized a 
large body of evidence, “conservatives seem to specialize in the in-group, avoiding risk, 
endorsing hierarchy, preferring tradition, supporting familiar values, and prioritizing 
family allegiance” (Fiske, 2011, p. 70). 
 Overall, the view of social or political attitudes that emerges from the intuitionist 
perspective is one in which “flashes of positive or negative affect emerge before rational 
considerations do” (Jones, 2011, p. 5). Rather than considered positions, these deep-
seated moral intuitions possess a quality of automaticity – they are more akin to 
predispositions. Individuals may subsequently offer or articulate (even to themselves) 
reasons for their views, but these justifications are often after-the-fact fabrications 
invented to put an attractive, rational-looking veneer on a judgment that emerged more 
from the gut. Or as Haidt (2012, p. 48) puts it, “moral reasons are the tail wagged by the 
intuitive dog.” 
 
HOW THESE MORAL INTUITIONS MAY RELATE TO LAND-USE 
PREFERENCES 
I hypothesize that these moral intuitions, deeply held but varying in strength 
across individuals, help explain why liberals and conservatives view compact 
development so differently. In the mental map of the political left, for example, mixed-
use, walkable neighborhoods would be favored, not primarily through a lens of 
environmentalism, but rather due to their association with the variety of experiences and 
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excitement that dense and urbane spaces frequently offer.  Liberals might also view infill 
and transit-oriented development as ways to prioritize fairness and prevent harm toward 
residents of older centers.  For those on the political left, moral outrage is directed at the 
way that suburban sprawl protects the already advantaged, cloistering the wealthy in 
newer housing, better school systems, and safer areas with higher tax bases, while other 
members of society are unjustly relegated to resource-poor, environmentally despoiled, 
and high-crime older neighborhoods.    
People on the political right, by contrast, are more likely to oppose compact 
development, as we have seen.  This opposition arises, I suggest, due to conservatives’ 
fear of a radical upending of what has become the traditional or status-quo development 
pattern (the Authority impulse). Their views are also activated by disgust at the potential 
for disorderly mixing of land uses and social activities, which might be viewed, under the 
Purity impulse, as a form of contamination. (Here, think of the possibility of bars or 
tattoo parlors close to residences and schools.) Conservatives’ karma-like sense of moral 
dessert (Haidt, 2012; Fiske, 2011, pp. 68-69) provides justification for the spatial 
separation of high- and low-status groups. In this view, the insertion of lower-cost 
housing into single-family, suburban neighborhoods would reward “people who don’t 
want to work” (“takers”) by allowing them to escape their less-pleasant environment, 
while the costs of this change in land-use patterns would be inflicted unjustly on hard-
working homeowners (“makers”). 
In addition, conservative individuals’ preference for orderliness and tendency 
toward conformity (Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) may incline them to 
prefer controlled, “nice” suburban residential environments where everything is in its 
15 
 
proper place.  One potentially relevant study shows that self-described conservatives tend 
to differ from liberals in the way they keep their personal environments; the study 
examined office employees’ workspaces and college students’ bedrooms (Carney et al., 
2008).  Conservatives’ bedrooms tended to have significantly more visible cleaning items 
(e.g., laundry basket, ironing board) and organizing elements (event calendars, postage 
stamps) than those of liberals, whereas liberals’ bedrooms had a wider variety of books 
and music albums.  Regarding office workers, independent coders (who did not know the 
self-reported ideology of the subjects) tended to rate the workspaces of conservatives as 
more conventional, old-fashioned, and unstylish than liberals’ workspaces. These 
nonverbal behaviors may signal design preferences that are also relevant to views about 
neighborhoods and the built environment. 
Psychological research also repeatedly demonstrates that people tend to form 
judgments about what is “typical” not from base rates and statistical regularities, but 
instead by focusing on vivid events and magnifying their likelihood; Kahneman (2011) 
refers to this tendency as the “representativeness heuristic.” Similarly, people often tend 
to use exemplar cases to stand in as prototypes for what is expected of the behavior of a 
larger group, even though the exemplar cases are usually atypical (Lakoff, 2009).  A 
notorious example is the mythical “welfare queen” who is used as a stand-in for all 
recipients of public assistance.  Because of these types of simplifying heuristics, liberals 
who answer a survey question about low-density, car-oriented, single-use suburban 
neighborhoods may quickly form a mental image of a bland, socially homogenous, 
stultifying, monotonous bedroom community.  Conservatives who hear survey questions 
about high-density, mixed-use, transit-oriented neighborhoods may quickly bring to mind 
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images of a disorderly, noisy, crime-ridden, graffiti-scarred slum. 
To sum up, my hypothesis is that those on the political left support mixed-use, 
dense, and transit-oriented neighborhoods because of the high value they place on notions 
of personal autonomy and openness to experience, their need for stimulating and creative 
environments, and their lower degree of identification with conventional social norms.  
For those on the political right, opposition to compact development and preference for 
traditional suburban patterns should be related to conservatives’ concern with purity and 
their heightened sense of disgust, their tendency to vigilantly monitor their environments 
for perceived threats, and their high identification with conventional social norms.  In 
addition, conservatives’ preference for order and neatness, stability, and ingroup loyalty 
all suggest a favorable attitude toward single-use, auto-oriented suburban environments 
and wariness of the unpredictability and diversity of mixed-use urban environments. 
I am not arguing that moral intuitions and personality traits are the only reasons 
for left/right differences in attitudes toward land-use patterns. There may well be other 
reasons why liberals and conservatives have different neighborhood preferences; among 
these might be the previously discussed environmental values and perceptions of self-
interest, but also other, difficult-to-measure tastes, such as preferred types of physical 
activity, of shopping or entertainment, or a simple desire to reside amongst others of 
similar political outlook. Nevertheless, my expectation is that holding ideology constant, 
residents’ moral intuitions and related personality traits contribute importantly to their 
attitudes regarding compact development. 
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ILLUSTRATIVE QUALITATIVE ACCOUNTS 
 There has not been any systematic or large-N research designed to examine the 
connections between moral intuitions or personality traits and attitudes toward urban 
development.6  It is not difficult, however, to find fragments of empirical material – 
illustrations might be a better word than data – that vividly support the notion that views 
about the built environment are connected to personal conceptions of order, impulses for 
purity and sanctity, or ingroup loyalty.   
Perhaps most colorfully, in recent years it has been reported that Tea Party groups 
bitterly opposed the Obama Administration’s Sustainable Communities program, which 
gave grants to support smart growth efforts in local communities. These conservatives 
saw Sustainable Communities “as the soft launch of a socialist-inspired U.N. takeover of 
America’s government” (McMorrow, 2011; see also Farrell, 2010), thereby expressing an 
Ingroup/Loyalty impulse.   
Commentators writing for popular audiences sometimes portray people with a 
passion for authority or orderliness, on the one hand, and for carefully controlled 
neighborhood environments on the other (e.g., Brooks, 2008). For instance, Garreau’s 
Edge City (1992) described how residents of suburban retirement communities in 
Arizona formed a large, well-armed, volunteer public-safety posse to patrol for crime 
while also helping to operate homeowner associations (HOAs) that stringently enforced 
rules about the upkeep of properties and the paint color of houses.  McKenzie’s more 
scholarly book, Privatopia (E. McKenzie, 1994), similarly highlighted how the quest to 
create a defended, predictable suburban realm often results in the strict and rigid 
enforcement of rules and standards by HOAs. 
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 In a penetrating ethnographic study of one HOA neighborhood, Maher (2003) 
described a “landscape of suburban fear” in which residents of a quiet, low-crime 
subdivision in Irvine, California, considered gating their community. Maher’s interviews 
with residents suggested that their anxiety and desire to “fortress” the neighborhood arose 
because of the unpredictability of social changes they saw as emanating from dense and 
diverse nearby cities such as Santa Ana. Residents acknowledged their neighborhood’s 
very low crime rate, but sought to protect its perimeter against (primarily Latino) 
outsiders; without a wall, they anticipated, there would be more “strangers” entering the 
neighborhood with “bad” cars, “rusty and scruffy looking,” in one resident’s estimation 
(Maher, 2003, p. 764). This portrait evokes the conservative moral values of 
Ingroup/Loyalty (outsiders invading the neighborhood) and Sanctity/Purity (a concern 
with possible contamination), as well as the personality predisposition toward neatness 
and orderliness. 
 Similar sentiments arise in Weitz’s (2008) study of a suburban neighborhood’s 
response to a municipal proposal for enhanced public transit. A neighborhood circulator 
(NC) had been proposed; the NC was a mini-bus that would provide a small-scale, 
subsidized public transit option through a primarily single-family residential area to 
connect with commercial areas. Weitz used content analysis of the written public 
comments that neighborhood residents submitted to the municipal government regarding 
the proposed NC. Although most of the comments were supportive, familiar themes 
emerge from Weitz’s analysis of the comments of the proposal’s opponents.  First, 
despite the inherently local-serving nature of an NC, many objections centered on the 
notion that unwanted outsiders would use the NC to enter the neighborhood. Automobile 
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reliance was seen as the norm, and opponents had trouble imagining anyone like 
themselves utilizing the circulator. Note the impulse toward conventionality, or as Weitz 
(2008, p. 169) described it, “the belief that a society constructed around automobiles is 
both best and a given.” Second, fears of social disorder linked to outgroups were apparent 
in the comments of some opponents: “[O]pponents warned that the NC would bring 
‘homeless/riff-raff,’ ‘the wrong kind of people,’ ‘undesirables,’ ‘bums and drunks,’ 
‘indigents,’ or ‘outside elements’ to their neighborhoods” (Weitz, 2008, p. 164), 
including at least one complaint that the circulator would draw illegal immigrants.  These 
comments evoke not only ingroup bonding against a perceived external threat, but also 
purity concerns. The latter are particularly evident in some cases where “opponents 
expressed concern that the NC would provide sexual predators with access to child 
victims” (p. 165) or “would enable their children to travel to [nearby] cities without 
parental consent” (pp. 167-68). 
Much of the literature on suburbia focuses on the effort to achieve separation 
from city environments and urban residents (Jackson, 1985; Hayden, 2003). However, 
efforts to avoid social mixing and unpredictable environments may also be important 
elements in structuring social relations within central cities. For instance, cultural critic 
Mike Davis (1992, p. 260) poked fun at conservative perspectives on urban public spaces 
as arising from a fear of the “democratic intoxications, risks, and undeoderized odors” of 
authentic city life.  In this passage, he raises both the activation of disgust (“odors”) and 
the threat to authority and order (“democratic intoxications, risks”) that moral 
intuitionists have described as characteristic of the conservative predisposition.  In 
reaction to such fear and disgust, the conservative project in Los Angeles, according to 
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Davis, has been to militarize the downtown, providing fortress-like security to office and 
retail complexes frequented by upper-status workers and consumers. Meanwhile, lower-
status outgroups, particularly the homeless, were shunted into separate zones deprived of 
amenities (such as L.A.’s infamous Skid Row district) and left to fend for themselves 
(Davis, 1992). 
 Evidence of moral intuitions about compact development, albeit fragmentary, can 
also be gleaned by examining unscripted commentary on growth issues and controversies 
by members of the general public, particularly comments made in protest or opposition to 
specific compact-development proposals.  Consider, for example, the comments posted 
online in reaction to a newspaper article about a proposed mixed-use development in a 
suburban portion of the Memphis area (S. McKenzie, 2007).  The plan was billed by 
proponents as smart growth-inspired.  One commenter, “Stevejoe,” wrote that the 
development would not be “anything the citizens want or need.” Rather, he said: 
Could it be that developers just want to pour concrete and collect rent? Build-it-
and-they-will-come may make a good movie plot, but in our case, who's coming? 
. . . .  This may all be conjecture, but remember the wise observation of Cheech & 
Chong: "it looks like dog (poop); smells like dog (poop); tastes like dog (poop); 
must be dog (poop).”  
Stevejoe invokes anxiety about the unpredictability of who or what might arrive 
after construction of the infill project (“who’s coming?”), along with annoyance toward 
the betrayal (by developers who just want to collect rent) of a presumed ingroup (“the 
citizens,” “in our case”) in favor of unnamed outsiders. Who or what might come, 
Stevejoe evidently fears, will result in defilement (the opposite of purity), as he raises the 
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disgust emotion by referring to excrement. Another commenter on the same zoning 
controversy, “AppalachianAmerican,” similarly draws upon impulses of disgust, 
authority, fear, and moral boundaries in voicing concerns about mixed-use development: 
There are reasons why traditional zoning laws separate residential from 
commercial development. It may be great to live within walking distance to 
restaurants but who wants to live with the rats? It may be great to have nearby 
shopping but who wants to see the "smash & grab" thieves running through your 
backyard? 
Of course, these types of empirical sources are very unsystematic. And we cannot 
know whether the individuals objecting to the proposed infill development or the NC 
transit service were political conservatives.  Even if they were not, however, the key 
point is that these cases show a set of underlying moral impulses – purity, authority, and 
protection of the ingroup – structuring opposition to compact development.  These moral 
impulses, studies show, are associated with a tendency to self-identify as conservative 
(Graham et al., 2009). But I argue that it is not simply policy reasoning derived from 
ideological principles that generates opinions of compact development; it is also the 
affect or emotion that individuals feel toward a compact, mixed-use, transit-accessible 
environment, the image or prototype of which activates deep-seated intuitions.  
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS USING SURVEY DATA 
 To investigate this hypothesis further, I draw upon the 2007 Southwest Poll by the 
Institute of Social Science Research at Arizona State University, a survey described and 
analyzed in Lewis and Baldassare (2010). This phone survey of a random sample of 
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1,013 adults living in four southwestern states (Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and 
Texas) included three questions, described above, about tradeoffs between compact 
development and traditional suburban development; these are the first three survey items 
listed in the note to Figure 1.7   
The goal of the current analysis is largely exploratory:  to examine whether 
aspects of the moral identity of survey respondents are associated with their stated 
preferences about compact development, once we control for other relevant individual 
characteristics.  To test the hypothesis, ideally one would field a survey that includes 
questions relating directly to respondents’ moral foundations or personality traits.  
However, the Southwest Poll was not fielded for this purpose; rather, it was an omnibus 
survey with questions that addressed a wide variety of different topics, questions that had 
been submitted separately by several different investigators. The three questions listed in 
Figure 1 were the only survey items directly related to land use or urban development. 
 There were no questions directly geared at measuring the moral foundations of 
survey respondents. However, I located three survey items submitted by other 
investigators that seem to tap, at least indirectly, into moral intuitions, particularly 
Ingroup/Loyalty or Authority/Respect, or that involve personality characteristics such as 
Openness to Experience. For want of a better term, I call these “morally-relevant 
variables” in the discussion below.  The variables are: 
 Low sense of national belonging.  One battery of questions dealt with 
respondents’ sense of belonging or identification with various geographic communities. 
The relevant part of the questionnaire read: 
I’d like you to rate your sense of belonging in the following places. For each  
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place, rate your sense of belonging using a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means you 
have “no sense of belonging” and 10 means you have “a very strong sense of 
belonging.”  . . .  The United States of America 
Most respondents gave very high ratings to their sense of belonging in the U.S., with 
three-quarters of the weighted sample giving a score of 9 or 10.  I created a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 for individuals who gave a belonging score of 5 or below (8% of 
the weighted sample), and 0 for those giving higher scores. My supposition is that 
individuals willing to give a low score to their sense of belonging as Americans would 
tend to score relatively low on the Ingroup/Loyalty moral foundation, as they are not so 
easily induced by patriotism or national pride to view themselves as “belonging” to 
America. In addition, these individuals may have low levels of social conformity and 
high levels of Openness to Experience, as they are not bound to their current nationality 
and possibly may view themselves as “citizens of the world.”  I thus expect the low-
belonging variable to be associated with favorable views toward compact development.   
 Lack of religious identification.  Respondents were asked, “What, if anything, is 
your religion?” I created a dummy variable set to a value of 1 for respondents who 
answered that they were atheist, agnostic, or had no religion (12% of the weighted 
sample), and 0 for all others.  Religiosity, at least in the recent U.S. context, has been 
linked to conservatism, whereas individuals with a secular, nonreligious worldview tend 
disproportionately to be political liberals (Fiorina et al., 2006, pp. 128-134). More 
importantly, one can surmise based on prior empirical studies that individuals who 
identify themselves as lacking any religious affiliation will tend to put a low priority on 
the Purity/Sanctity foundation (which is linked to conceptions of the divine) and on the 
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Authority/Respect foundation (which deals with obedience to recognized sources of 
authority) (McAdams et al., 2008; Balzer, 2011). Nonreligious individuals may also tend 
toward low levels of social conformity and high levels of Openness to Experience, as 
they do not wish to bind themselves to one particular religious tradition. Accordingly, I 
anticipate that lack of religious identification will be associated with favorable views 
toward compact development. 
 Anti-immigration sentiment. As part of a battery of questions regarding attitudes 
on immigration, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with this 
statement: “I would be willing to pay more for goods and services such as groceries, 
housekeeping, childcare and entertainment to keep out undocumented immigrants.” I 
code those who strongly or somewhat agree with this statement (48% of the weighted 
sample) as 1; those who somewhat or strongly disagree, “neither agree nor disagree,” or 
don’t know are coded 0.  The wording of this question is useful in that, like the land-use 
questions, it forces respondents to make a tradeoff; they must indicate not just a 
generalized displeasure with illegal immigration, but a willingness to pay to keep 
unauthorized foreigners away.  This question has obvious relevance for the Ingroup/ 
Loyalty foundation (patrolling boundaries and guarding against subversion) and the 
Authority/Respect foundation (as authoritarians tend to view undocumented immigrants 
as “lawbreakers plain and simple”; see Hetherington & Weiler (2009, p. 168)).  For 
individuals who are highly nationalistic or who hold ethnic prejudice against immigrant 
groups, it is also possible that the desire to keep out immigrants is connected to 
conceptions of Purity/Sanctity. For these reasons, I anticipate that the willingness to pay 
to keep out immigrants will be associated with unfavorable views toward compact 
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development. 
 Each of the three morally-relevant variables tap into certain aspects of personality 
and moral worldview, such as Openness to Experience, Purity/Sanctity, and 
Ingroup/Loyalty. Nevertheless, these are clearly indirect proxies, at best, for survey 
respondents’ moral foundations or personality. Given the absence of direct measures in 
extant surveys about land-use preferences, these measures are used because of 
convenience, and thus conclusions about moral intuitions in the analysis below should be 
treated as suggestive rather than definitive. It is hoped that, in combination with the 
qualitative accounts discussed earlier, the quantitative analysis will allow triangulation 
among imperfect sources of evidence, suggesting the flavor and potential of how moral 
intuitions might translate into views on urban development patterns. 
 In the statistical analysis discussed below, logit regression is employed because 
the dependent variable in each regression is dichotomous:  For each tradeoff question, a 
response indicating a preference for the compact-development alternative is coded 1, 
whereas a response indicating a preference for traditional single-use suburban 
development is coded 0. I use multivariate models that are essentially identical to those 
reported for the Southwest survey in Lewis and Baldassare (2010), except that the 
morally-relevant variables described above are added, one at a time, as independent 
variables. The other alteration is that in the regressions dealing with the sense of 
belonging to the United States or with anti-immigration sentiment, I omit foreign-born 
respondents from the analysis. These questions likely provoke a different moral framing 
for residents born outside the United States. For example, many immigrants may have a 
relatively complex sense of national identity. However, immigrants are included in the 
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models involving the “nonreligious” variable. 
All of the regressions control for political ideology (using an indicator variable for 
self-described conservatives). Thus, the effect (if any) of the morally-relevant variables 
will be one that is independent of the respondents’ political ideology.8 Although I do not 
view the hypothesized influence of the moral variables as necessarily competing with the 
effect of ideology, I anticipate that the moral variables will have some predictive 
capability even when controlling for ideology. 
In the discussion below, I focus attention on the estimation results for the morally-
relevant independent variables and the political ideology variable. I will say little here 
about the 20 additional independent variables that measured respondents’ life-cycle 
characteristics and presence of children in the household, demographic background and 
socioeconomic status, perceptions of their current community, and state dummy 
variables. The theoretical reasoning for including these variables as potential predictors 
of attitudes toward compact development is detailed in Lewis and Baldassare (2010), but 
in the current analysis they function simply as controls.  The signs and significance of 
each of these control variables in the current analysis is similar to that reported in Lewis 
and Baldassare (2010: 229).9 As in that study, I weight the observations in the model 
using the survey weights provided by the survey organization, which make the survey 
sample quite representative of the adult population of the four Southwestern states  
(Lewis & Baldassare, 2010, pp. 223-24). 
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DISCUSSION OF MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
 Low sense of national belonging.  The first set of results, in Table 1, indicates that 
individuals who report feeling low levels of communal belonging to the United States 
tend to be significantly more approving of living in a small house with a small yard and 
short commute, as compared to a large house and yard with a long commute. They also 
tend to favor mixed-use neighborhoods where they can walk to stores and services (as 
opposed to solely residential, driving-oriented neighborhoods), although this relationship 
is weaker.  Contrary to expectations, “low belonging” individuals tend to be unfavorable 
toward living in a high density, transit-oriented neighborhood (rather than a low-density, 
car-oriented environment), though this association is only marginally significant.  It is 
possible that the appearance of the off-putting “D word” in that survey question (which 
unlike the other two, overtly mentions “high density”) causes these respondents to frame 
the transit-oriented development concept in a different way than they conceive of the 
other two tradeoff questions.  (Moreover, being densely housed amidst other Americans, 
for respondents with low ingroup identification, may not sound especially appealing.)  
Otherwise, however, this set of results conforms to expectations.  The openness to 
experience that is a likely characteristic of these low-nationalism respondents may render 
them favorable toward the variety of mixed-use areas, and their relatively low allegiance 
to social conformity may mean that they are not drawn toward the traditional American 
ideal of large-lot suburban living. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Lack of religious identification  The estimates in Table 2 indicate that secular 
individuals – respondents who report atheism, agnosticism, or no religious identification 
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– are more likely to favor all three of the compact-development alternatives over the 
traditional suburban options.  Results are strongest for the high-density, transit-oriented 
alternative, but are statistically weaker (with significance at the 10% level) for the small-
house/short-commute, and mixed-use alternatives.  The relatively low impulse toward 
social conformity that probably characterizes religious nonbelievers, as well as their 
probable low inclination toward the Purity/Sanctity and Authority/Respect foundations, 
may lead them to tolerate and even enjoy the diversity, unpredictability, and occasional 
disorder of dense, mixed-use environments where car ownership is unnecessary.  These 
may be individuals for whom the “undeoderized odors” of city life are not a problem, but 
rather represent a type of authenticity that they embrace. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Anti-immigration sentiment. I anticipated that those willing to pay to exclude 
undocumented immigrants tend to be drawn toward the Ingroup/ Loyalty and 
Authority/Respect moral foundations, which I expected to be negatively associated with 
views toward compact development.  Two of the three regressions reported in Table 3 
bear out this expectation.  First, those who are more opposed to undocumented 
immigration are significantly less likely than others to want to live in a small house with 
a small yard (but a short commute). Second, anti-illegal immigration respondents are also 
disinclined to live in a walkable, mixed-use neighborhood.  However, the relationship 
between immigration views and the high-density, transit-oriented neighborhood 
preference, while signed in the expected direction, lacks statistical significance.  Overall, 
though, one may infer that the concern that the anti-illegal immigration respondents have 
for security and their wariness of intrusion may incline them toward living in detached, 
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large-lot homes, and in neighborhoods separated from nonresidential uses.  One might 
speculate, as well, that these individuals feel more secure transporting themselves to work 
or shopping in a (lockable) automobile, rather than engaging in the seemingly more 
vulnerable act of walking. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 In each of the models, conservative ideology also continues to be associated with 
a low probability of preferring the compact development alternative. Thus, the morally 
relevant variables certainly do not replace ideology, but they importantly supplement it. 
They may also go some partial way toward explaining ideology’s importance. Compared 
to models without the moral variables, the inclusion of the moral variables reduces the 
effect size and significance of ideology, at least slightly. To consider the substantive 
impact of ideology and the moral variables, Table 4 shows the changes in the probability 
of a pro-smart growth response when values of the key independent variables are 
changed from 0 to 1. These estimates reveal that the effect sizes of the moral variables 
are generally of similar magnitude to the effect sizes of ideology, with each concentrated 
around a 10% change in probability. The moral variables exceed the ideology variable in 
influence for the “small house, short commute” preference. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
CONCLUSION AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Despite the efforts of smart growth proponents to portray the move toward 
compact development as a commonsense reform that everyone can embrace, it is 
increasingly clear that there is a fairly substantial left/right political cleavage on views 
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toward the built environment. Further, this polarization in views is not easily explainable 
by merely pointing to different ideological positions about the role of government in 
regulating the economy. Indeed, liberals and conservatives differ in the types of built 
environments they say they would like to live in, not merely in their preferences for 
public policies toward land use. Rather, I have suggested that these differences in 
attitudes toward compact development become more understandable in light of the 
fundamentally different moral intuitions that liberals and conservatives have about the 
social world, as well as the different personality dispositions of these two groups. 
 Although systematic data are not available, I have provided public opinion 
evidence that connects three views on the built environment to three proxy measures for 
moral foundations and personality traits.  Of the nine regressions, seven had statistically 
significant results pointing in the hypothesized direction, one went contrary to theoretical 
expectations, and one was indeterminate. Ethnographic and impressionistic evidence 
from other studies and accounts also suggests patterns that support my hypothesis, with 
concerns for purity, social order, and ingroup loyalty apparently connected to preferences 
for separated land uses and auto-oriented suburban development. 
 Ideally, future studies would be geared toward collecting and analyzing data so 
that analysts would be able to plumb this hypothesized relationship more systematically. 
A specialized opinion survey on this topic not only might ask about a wider variety of 
land-use, neighborhood, and transportation preferences, but also about a broader set of 
political and moral viewpoints. For instance, some research suggests that social 
conservatism, but not economic conservatism, is predictive of views on compact 
development (Handy et al., 2008), a finding that receives some indirect support from this 
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analysis, and one that connects with political psychologists’ findings of a link between 
sociocultural conservatism and authoritarian attitudes.  Ideally, an opinion survey on 
attitudes toward the built environment would include questions on deep-seated, “pre-
political” inclinations, such as views on family life and disciplining children 
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; McAdams et al., 2008; Lakoff, 2009), social interaction 
styles (Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2003), or sensitivity toward disgust (Schnall et al., 
2008). Including Haidt and colleagues’ lengthy Moral Foundations questionnaire within 
the survey (difficult in a phone survey, but more practical in an Internet- or paper-based 
questionnaire) would allow one to test in a more direct way whether people’s moral 
foundations are closely linked to their preferences about the built environment. Including 
a personality inventory within a survey would allow for more direct tests of the links 
between personality traits and attitudes toward urban development. 
 A particularly intriguing possibility would be to embed an experiment within a 
survey on land-use preferences.  Psychological research indicates that certain frames, 
images, or narrative scenarios can prompt or heighten concerns such as purity, authority, 
or ingroup loyalty, often eliciting more conservative-leaning responses to subsequent 
survey questions (Jost et al., 2003; Westen, 2007). So, for instance, including elements in 
a survey script that prime such concepts as mortality and death anxiety, danger or 
security threats, or contamination and disgust might be expected to provoke instincts to 
fortress, inclining experimental subjects to report more negative views toward mixed-use 
or high-density neighborhood patters.  This type of research might be able to suggest to 
smart-growth proponents (and opponents) the types of frames, images, and narratives that 
they must manage in order to make people receptive to their position. 
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 Moving beyond the relatively artificial format of surveys and lab experiments, 
which typically deal with hypothetical situations, it also would be enlightening to 
examine the unscripted comments of proponents and opponents of compact development 
in the context of specific controversies and proposals, whether at public hearings, in 
online forums, or in focus groups. Content analysis could then be used to characterize the 
particular sorts of moral and pragmatic arguments that are raised by proponents and 
opponents.10  
 In sum, this type of research offers a potentially exciting new way to understand 
how humans interact with the urban environment. Urbanists have long held that “place 
matters” (Dreier et al., 2001). Places, especially those officially demarcated by 
jurisdictional boundaries, serve as more than simply neutral containers (Weiher, 1991; 
Oliver, 2001). Rather, places serve to sort, concentrate, and aggregate people, social 
groups, building types, and activities, in the process making these places more distinctive 
to us. In turn, this distinctiveness likely influences the way individuals perceive and 
identify with (or against) particular neighborhoods and cities. Understanding the way that 
personality traits covary with the lived urban experience, and with perceptions of 
neighborhoods, could be of foundational importance to understanding how people judge 
and make decisions about where and how to live. Scholars have begun to investigate how 
ideological allegiances may affect people’s self-selection into particular places when they 
migrate (Cho, Gimpel, & Hui, 2013; Walks, 2006), and it is possible (if perhaps overly 
ambitious) to envision a research program that would integrate longitudinal, individual-
level data on personality, political ideology, moral intuitions, migration decisions, and 
place characteristics.11 
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Urbanists have long concerned themselves with the “legibility” of cities to their 
inhabitants and visitors (Lynch, 1960). But the hypothesis raised in this article suggests 
that when liberals and conservatives view the city, they do not see the same reality.  
Accordingly, academic urbanists, who tend to lean toward the political left (for reasons 
that ought to be apparent from the discussion of moral foundations above), may not 
recognize the moral impulses that conservatives feel (Haidt & Graham, 2007) toward 
compact, urbane neighborhoods. In short, people’s very different views of the good city, 
or the good suburb, may well emerge as part and parcel of their very different intuitions 
about the well-lived life. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                            
1 One should not carry this argument too far, however, to cover all elements of the 
compact-development reform program. For instance, strict urban growth boundaries and 
restrictions on subdivision of greenfield land are supported by many in the smart-growth 
movement, but these policies involve substantial government restrictions on private 
actors.  Heavy subsidies for mass transit would similarly be viewed with disfavor by 
devotees of the market, although many neoclassical economic analyses do support tolls 
on driving in order to price the externalities created by auto use. 
2 In an alternative, somewhat similar perspective, (dis)approval of particular policies is 
shaped by the affect or heuristics that citizens hold regarding the recipients or target 
population of the policy (Sniderman et al., 1986; Lawrence, Stoker, & Wolman, 2013), 
with such heuristics often reflecting a broader process of social construction (Schneider 
& Ingram, 1993). 
3 Haidt and his associates’ work on moral foundations and social intuitionism has gained 
widespread visibility and acceptance in social psychology and beyond, with a large and 
growing number of academic citations (though for critiques, see Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 
2004; Suhler & Churchland, 2011).  
4 Aside from any genetic factors, social psychologists and neuroscientists stress the 
importance of a variety of environmental influences in influencing rapid judgments and 
unconscious behaviors (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999). Indeed, it is believed that through 
the process known as neuroplasticity, environmental influences can become imprinted in 
thinking patterns through, for example, repetition or associative learning (Doidge, 2007).  
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5 Hetherington and Weiler (2009, pp. 48-49) use a battery of questions on child-rearing 
practices to construct a scale of what they refer to as “authoritarian” tendencies. 
Authoritarians are seen as a subgroup of conservatives (see also Altemeyer, 1996) who 
have a “mind-set [that] is a kind of secular or ecumenical analogue to a fundamentalist 
religious worldview. . . an outlook that would reject multiple, layered interpretations in 
favor of an outlook motivated by the belief that too much slack and uncertainty in rule 
application could yield disorder, chaos, and social breakdown” (Hetherington & Weiler, 
2009, p. 35). Such an outlook might well extend to views of preferred neighborhood 
land-use patterns. 
6 However, some limited quantitative evidence (analysis of variance) from one study 
suggests a possible link between personality traits and choice of neighborhood, with 
results that are broadly congruent with my hypotheses. Schwanen and Mokhtarian (2007, 
p. 192) find that denser, more diverse neighborhoods tend to attract people who think of 
themselves as adventurous or seekers of variety, as well as loners. By contrast, “the 
pattern for the organizer factor is the reverse of the loner factor,” suggesting that those 
with a penchant for structure and organization tend to be attracted to traditional suburban 
settings.  
7 Because of “don’t know” answers and refusals to answer certain questions, as well as 
the exclusion of foreign-born respondents from some of the analyses below, the number 
of observations in the regressions is about one-third smaller than the full survey sample. 
8 In two out of three cases, there are highly significant pairwise correlations between 
political ideology and the morally relevant variable. However, the correlations are not so 
high as to create serious concerns about collinearity in the model.  The correlation of 
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conservatism with each of the variables is: Low U.S. belonging (-.02, n.s.), Respondent 
not religious (-.14, p<.001), Would pay to keep out immigrants (.18, p<.001). 
9 These control variables include the following dummy variables representing the 
respondent’s status:  age 18-24, age 25-34, age 35-44, age 55-64, age 65 and over 
(omitted age category is 45-54); female; black; Hispanic; household income of less than 
$35,000/year, household income of greater than $75,000/year (omitted category is 
$35,000-$74,999); bachelor’s degree or higher educational attainment; renter; moved to 
current address within prior 12 months; reported dissatisfaction with current community’s 
transportation system, reported dissatisfaction with supply of decent and affordable 
housing; reported crime victimization during prior 12 months; and indicators for 
residence in Arizona, New Mexico, and Nevada (omitted category is Texas).  In the logit 
regressions where we focus on respondents’ religious identification (Table 2), a control 
variable for foreign-born respondents is also included. Foreign-born respondents are 
excluded from the other two sets of regressions. 
10 This type of approach would be analogous to Graham, Haidt, and Joseph’s (2009) 
content analysis of religious sermons, in which they found that (conservative) Southern 
Baptist ministers tended to use words and phrases associated with the moral foundations 
of Authority/Respect and Sanctity/Purity, whereas (liberal) Unitarian Universalist 
sermons were much higher than Baptist sermons in use of wording related to Harm/Care 
and Fairness/Reciprocity. 
11 The interplay between these factors may well be iterative. For example, the experience 
of living in a particular kind of place (e.g., single-use residential and auto-oriented versus 
diverse and walkable) may dispose residents toward particular perspectives on social life, 
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the self, and the role of government. These views, in turn, may influence self-selection in 
migration to new neighborhoods (Walks, 2004; see also Gainsborough, 2001). It is also 
possible that wrenching neighborhood transformations experienced by some residents 
(e.g., white ethnics in city neighborhoods that underwent rapid racial change and 
disinvestment in the 1970s) may shift their perspectives about favored land-use patterns 
(e.g., toward a desire for suburban fortressing) (Rieder, 1985).  
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FIGURE 1  
Degree to Which Liberal Support Exceeds Conservative Support for Compact 
Development Alternatives 
 
 
 
Notes:  Wording of questions in the surveys: (1) “Would you choose to live in a small 
home with a small backyard, even if it means you have a short commute to work? Or 
would you choose to live in a large home with a large backyard, even if it means you 
would have a long commute to work?” (2) “Would you choose to live in a mixed-use 
neighborhood where you can walk to stores, schools, and services? Or would you choose 
to live in a residential-only neighborhood, even if it means you have to drive a car to 
stores, schools, and services?” (3) “Would you choose to live in a high-density 
neighborhood where it was convenient to use public transit when you traveled locally? Or 
would you choose to live in a low-density neighborhood where you would have to drive 
your car when you travel locally?” (4) “Which comes closest to your view:  Local 
governments should steer growth to already developed areas of your region in order to 
preserve open space and encourage the use of public transit; or, local governments should 
allow growth in undeveloped areas in your region in order to avoid high density and 
traffic congestion.” Item (4) was not included in the survey of Southwestern states. 
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TABLE 1 
Neighborhood Preferences as a Function of Low National Belonging, Ideology, and 
Control Variables 
Prefer small 
house/yard, 
short commute 
Prefer mixed-
use, walkable 
Prefer dense, 
transit-oriented 
Moral Identity and Ideology    
Low sense of U.S. belonging 1.094 (.367)** .608 (.335)# -.609 (.361)# 
Conservative ideology -.423 (.184)* -.557 (.182)** -.630 (.201)** 
Other Characteristics    
Children in household -.321 (.210) -.040 (.215) .063 (.229) 
Age 18-24 -.566 (.323)# -.175 (.321) 1.160 (.350)** 
Age 25-34 -.380 (.311) -.203 (.309) .413 (.336) 
Age 35-44 -.657 (.291)* -.149 (.286) .501 (.318) 
Age 55-64 .522 (.332) -.521 (.309)# .932 (.346)** 
Age 65 and over .003 (.333) -.001 (.325) .012 (.389) 
Female .684 (.185)** -.123 (.181) -.152 (.195) 
Black .833 (.338)* 1.494 (.352)** 1.639 (.362)** 
Hispanic -.188 (.231) .829 (.231)** .695 (.237)** 
Income below $35,000 .092 (.250) .212 (.244) .791 (.254)** 
Income of $75,000 or more -.516 (.218)* -.329 (.213) .241 (.234) 
B.A. degree or higher .053 (.212) .402 (.207)# .426 (.225)# 
Renter -.467 (.252)# -.072 (.252) .326 (.264) 
Recent mover -.264 (.190) .261 (.187) .441 (.200)* 
Dissatisfied with transport .002 (.189) .590 (.186)** .095 (.199) 
Dissatisfied with affordable housing -.524 (.195)** -.258 (.192) .068 (.201) 
Recent crime victim .058 (.227) -.221 (.221) -.509 (.248)* 
Arizona resident .557 (.237)* .194 (.229) .500 (.239)* 
New Mexico resident .669 (.374)# .281 (.367) .081 (.381) 
Nevada resident .098 (.374) .385 (.357) .200 (.389) 
Constant .734 (.314)* -.128 (.304) -1.875 (.365)** 
Fit Statistics    
McFadden pseudo R-sq. 0.112 0.095 0.152 
McKelvey & Zavaina pseudo R-sq. 0.187 0.159 0.247 
% of 0’s correctly predicted 60 64 73 
% of 1’s correctly predicted 68 62 59 
Prob > chi-sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 657 656 661 
Notes:  #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.  Logit regression coefficients are reported, with 
standard errors in parentheses. All variables are dichotomous. Foreign-born survey 
respondents excluded. Omitted categories: age 45-54, middle-income, Texas resident. 
See Table 4 for effect sizes of key variables. 
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TABLE 2 
Neighborhood Preferences as a Function of Lack of Religious Affiliation, Ideology, 
and Control Variables 
 Prefer small 
house/yard, 
short commute 
Prefer mixed-
use, walkable 
Prefer dense, 
transit-oriented 
Moral Identity and Ideology    
Lack of religious affiliation .418 (.253)# .454 (.241)# .706 (.249)** 
Conservative ideology -.316 (.175)# -.504 (.173)** -.810 (.190)** 
Other Characteristics    
Children in household -.416 (.191)* .008 (.196) .135 (.207) 
Age 18-24 -.419 (.300) -.176 (.300) .863 (.328)** 
Age 25-34 -.311 (.293) -.202 (.294) .330 (.320) 
Age 35-44 -.519 (.273)# -.039 (.271) .422 (.301) 
Age 55-64 .456 (.317) -.391 (.298) .882 (.335)** 
Age 65 and over .001 (.327) .037 (.320) .059 (.383) 
Female .561 (.171)** -.012 (.169) .057 (.181) 
Black .593 (.317)# 1.280 (.325)** 1.519 (.339)** 
Hispanic -.133 (.212) 1.080 (.217)** .673 (.220)** 
Foreign-born .588 (.298)* .181 (.290) -.230 (.300) 
Income below $35,000 .361 (.225) .133 (.219) .546 (.227)* 
Income of $75,000 or more -.553 (.206)** -.394 (.203)# .172 (.225) 
B.A. degree or higher -.071 (.202) .253 (.199) .459 (.216)* 
Renter -.742 (.222)** .279 (.223) .365 (.230) 
Recent mover -.081 (.176) .036 (.175) .465 (.187)* 
Dissatisfied with transport .002 (.180) .545 (.179)** .001 (.191) 
Dissatisfied with affordable housing -.540 (.188)** -.335 (.188)# .087 (.198) 
Recent crime victim -.025 (.220) -.193 (.217) -.438 (.241)# 
Arizona resident .322 (.227) .166 (.222) .561 (.229)* 
New Mexico resident .531 (.365) .250 (.362) .204 (.367) 
Nevada resident -.164 (.359) .037 (.348) -.174 (.395) 
Constant .792 (.304)** -.133 (.296) -1.923 (.354)** 
Fit Statistics    
McFadden pseudo R-sq. 0.094 0.091 0.141 
McKelvey & Zavaina pseudo R-sq. 0.164 0.155 0.237 
% of 0’s correctly predicted 61 62 73 
% of 1’s correctly predicted 68 61 57 
Prob > chi-sq 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 702 703 707 
Notes:  #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.  Logit regression coefficients are reported, with 
standard errors in parentheses. All variables are dichotomous. Omitted categories: age 
45-54, middle-income, Texas resident. See Table 4 for effect sizes of key variables. 
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TABLE 3 
Neighborhood Preferences as a Function of Anti-Immigration Sentiment, Ideology, 
and Control Variables 
 Prefer small 
house/yard, 
short commute 
Prefer mixed-
use, walkable 
Prefer dense, 
transit-oriented 
Moral Identity and Ideology    
Would pay to keep out 
undocumented immigrants 
-.525 (.184)** -.421 (.180)* -.187 (.194) 
Conservative ideology -.337 (.185)# -.500 (.183)** -.599 (.201)** 
Other Characteristics    
Children in household -.351 (.209)# -.079 (.215) .090 (.228) 
Age 18-24 -.488 (.323) -.164 (.320) 1.150 (.350)** 
Age 25-34 -.389 (.313) -.231 (.311) .382 (.337) 
Age 35-44 -.610 (.289)* -.133 (.286) .466 (.317) 
Age 55-64 .511 (.332) -.532 (.309)# .886 (.347)* 
Age 65 and over .030 (.335) -.028 (.326) .068 (.388) 
Female .598 (.182)** -.200 (.180) -.133 (.193) 
Black .774 (.335)* 1.461 (.350)** 1.643 (.362)** 
Hispanic -.258 (.233) .768 (.233)** .613 (.237)* 
Income below $35,000 .113 (.248) .238 (.243) .767 (.252)** 
Income of $75,000 or more -.566 (.217)** -.361 (.213)# .277 (.233) 
B.A. degree or higher -.019 (.211) .353 (.207)# .441 (.224)# 
Renter -.454 (.251)# -.048 (.252) .392 (.264) 
Recent mover -.258 (.190) -.247 (.188) .412 (.199)* 
Dissatisfied with transport .118 (.187) .673 (.186)** .063 (.197) 
Dissatisfied with affordable housing -.537 (.195)** -.248 (.193) .085 (.202) 
Recent crime victim .095 (.229) -.191 (.222) -.487 (.249)# 
Arizona resident .490 (.237)* .147 (.230) .505 (.239)* 
New Mexico resident .506 (.372) .138 (.371) .073 (.382) 
Nevada resident .077 (.374) .352 (.357) .233 (.389) 
Constant 1.096 (.331)** .176 (.318) -1.842 (.378)** 
Fit Statistics    
McFadden pseudo R-sq. 0.110 0.098 0.150 
McKelvey & Zavaina pseudo R-sq. 0.186 0.162 0.242 
% of 0’s correctly predicted 61 64 73 
% of 1’s correctly predicted 69 61 60 
Prob > chi-sq 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 658 657 662 
Notes:  #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01.  Logit regression coefficients are reported, with 
standard errors in parentheses. All variables are dichotomous. Foreign-born survey 
respondents excluded. Omitted categories: age 45-54, middle-income, Texas resident. 
See Table 4 for effect sizes of key variables. 
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TABLE 4 
Changes in the Estimated Probability of Favoring Compact Development, as 
Morally Relevant Variables and Ideology Change 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Prefer small 
house/yard, 
short commute 
Prefer mixed-
use, walkable 
Prefer dense, 
transit-oriented 
From Table 1 models:   
Low sense of U.S. belonging 0.21 0.13 -0.11 
Conservative ideology -0.09 -0.12 -0.12 
   
From Table 2 models:   
Lack of religious affiliation 0.09 0.10 0.14 
Conservative ideology -0.07 -0.11 -0.16 
   
From Table 3 models:   
Would pay to keep out 
undocumented immigrants 
-0.11 -0.09 -0.04 
Conservative ideology -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 
 
Notes: Values reported are the estimated changes in the probability of a pro-“smart 
growth” response on the dependent variable as the independent variable is changed from 
0 to 1 and all other independent variables in the model are held constant. Values are 
calculated using the "margins" command in Stata 12. 
 
 
